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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Tyrell Erlebach and Bruce Erlebach appeal from the dismissal without 
prejudice of indictments against them.  They assert such dismissals should have 
been with prejudice. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Tyrell Erlebach came home in the wee hours of the morning highly 
intoxicated.  (#44470 R., p. 13; G.J. Tr., p. 7, L. 4 – p. 8, L. 3; p. 17, L. 17 – p. 18, 
L. 8.)  He took his clothes off, told his girlfriend K.B. (who was in bed with their 
son) he was going to show her “what his little penis was going to do to [her],” got 
on top of her, choked her and poked her in the eye.  (#44470 R., p. 13; G.J. Tr., 
p. 8, L. 7 – p. 16, L. 19.)  After several minutes of this he let K.B. up, and she 
went to the couch, but he followed her, still naked, and, as he “pulled [her] 
underwear to the side [he] told [her] that he was going to show [her] what his little 
penis was going to do” and also told her that if she did not get back to the 
bedroom he was going to “bury” her.  (G.J. Tr., p. 16, L. 20 – p. 20, L. 16.)  K.B. 
returned to the bedroom and was at some point able to get away from Tyrell, 
grabbed a pistol, and pointed it at Tyrell, telling him to stay away.  (#44470 R., 
p. 13; G.J. Tr., p. 20, L. 23 – p. 23, L. 9.)  Tyrell reacted by getting another gun 
and threatening both K.B. and their son with it.  (#44470 R., p. 13; #44468 R., 
p. 17; G.J. Tr., p. 22, L. 15 – p. 24, L. 19.)  K.B. then barricaded herself and the 
children in a bedroom for a time before fleeing the house to a neighbor’s home.  




Ls. 16-19.)  As she fled she heard two gunshots.  (#44470 R., p. 13; #44468 R., 
p. 17; G.J. Tr., p. 26, L. 11 – p. 27, L. 12.)   
 K.B.’s father, Larry, arrived at the house before police officers.  (#44470 
R., p. 13; G.J. Tr., p. 45, L. 13 – p. 50, L. 11.)  Tyrell attacked him and inflicted 
serious injuries on Larry, including breaking bones in his face.  (#44470 R., 
pp. 13-14; #44468 R., p. 17; G.J. Tr., p. 50, L. 12 – p. 57, L. 12.)   
 When officers attempted to arrest Tyrell he resisted, striking two officers 
before officers deployed a Taser.  (#44470 R., p. 14; G.J. Tr., p. 67, L. 17 – p. 72, 
L. 8; p. 88, L. 16 – p. 91, L. 12.)  While officers were arresting Tyrell, his father, 
Bruce, arrived at the scene, punched one of the arresting officers in the face, and 
also had to be tazed to be taken into custody.  (#44470 R., p. 14; G.J. Tr., p. 72, 
Ls. 9-24; p. 74, L. 19 – p. 75, L. 4; p. 91, L. 12 – p. 92, L. 19.) 
 The state filed complaints charging Tyrell with attempted rape, attempted 
strangulation, battery on a law enforcement officer, and aggravated battery 
(#44468 R., pp. 11-12), and Bruce with felony battery on a law enforcement 
officer and misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer (#44470 R., pp. 6-
7).  A grand jury later handed down indictments against Tyrell for attempted rape, 
attempted strangulation, felony domestic violence, injury to a child, two counts of 
intimidating a witness, aggravated battery, and two counts of battery on a law 
enforcement officer (#44468 R., pp. 43-46) and against Bruce for battery on a 
law enforcement officer (#44470 R., pp 34-35).   
 Tyrell and Bruce filed motions to dismiss the indictments and to suppress 




R., pp. 1-26)  The bases for the motions to dismiss were claims that there were 
fewer than 12 impartial grand jurors, that false or inadmissible evidence was 
admitted, and that “defects” in the proceedings prejudiced the defendants.  
(#44468 Sealed R., p. 1; #44470 Sealed R., p. 17.)  The state responded to 
these arguments.  (#44470 R., pp. 113-16; #44468 Sealed R., pp. 84-109; 
#44468 R., pp. 271-73.)   
 The district court granted the motions to dismiss.  (#44468 R., pp. 311-19; 
#44470 R., pp. 119-27.)  Specifically, the district court found that one of the 
twelve grand jurors admitted bias1 and that her statements that she would “‘try’” 
to be impartial and “‘think[s]’” she can be impartial were not an “unequivocal 
assurance” of impartiality.  (#44468 R., pp. 314-16; #44470 R., pp. 122-24.)  
Because only eleven of the twelve grand jurors who returned the indictments 
were qualified, the indictments had to be dismissed.  (#44468 R., p. 317; #44470 
R., pp. 124-25.)  Defendants moved for clarification whether the dismissals were 
with prejudice (#44468 R., pp. 321-29; #44470 R., pp. 129-35) and the district 
court entered orders of dismissal without prejudice, citing I.C.R. 48 (#44468 R., 
p. 330; #44470 R., p. 136).  Tyrell and Bruce filed notices of appeal timely from 
the dismissal orders.  (#44468 R., pp. 339-46; #44470 R., pp. 140-44.) 
   
                                            
1 The grand juror worked with Larry Butler, one of Tyrell’s victims, and she said 






 The Erlebachs state the issues on appeal as: 
A. (1) Does the district court have supervisory power to dismiss 
an indictment with prejudice for governmental misconduct?  
(2)  Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the 
request for dismissal with prejudice? 
 
B. Did the district court err in failing to make requested findings 
of fact regarding the motions to dismiss with prejudice, 
particularly regarding the evidence showing prosecutorial 
misconduct and resultant prejudice? 
 
C. Did the district court err in dismissing the indictment without 
prejudice as the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct at the 
Grand Jury and the resultant prejudice to the Erlebachs 
require a dismissal with prejudice? 
 
(Appellants’ brief, p. 10.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Have the Erlebachs failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the 









The Erlebachs Have Failed To Demonstrate Any Abuse Of Discretion In The 




 Tyrell and Bruce “challeng[ed] the impartiality” of three grand jurors.  
(#44468, R., p. 314; #44470 R., p. 122.)  The district court concluded that one of 
the challenged grand jurors had admitted bias because she worked with Larry 
Butler, had heard rumors Larry had been beaten up, and was aware of a 
collection at work to assist Larry, and had admitted that this information would 
negatively affect her ability to evaluate the facts.  (#44468, R., p. 314; #44470 R., 
p. 122.)  This bias was not dispelled by the grand juror’s statements she could be 
impartial because such statements were not “unequivocal.”  (#44468, R., 
pp. 314-16; #44470 R., pp. 122-24.)  Because that left only eleven jurors who 
had voted to indict, the indictments had to be dismissed.   (#44468, R., p. 317; 
#44470 R., pp. 124-25.)  Application of the relevant legal standards shows that 
the district court properly dismissed without prejudice where the only error was 
that one of the grand jurors was not qualified because her assertions that she 
could be impartial were equivocal. 
 The Erlebachs assert the district court erred by not dismissing with 
prejudice, first arguing that the district court’s citation to I.C.R. 48, allowing 
dismissal without prejudice, in its orders dismissing without prejudice, shows the 
district court abused its discretion.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 10-15.)  The argument 
that the district court’s citation to a rule that specifically authorized the action it 




 The Erlebachs next argue that the district court erred by failing to make 
findings of fact.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 15-16.)  The record, however, shows the 
district court made the findings of fact it deemed relevant to its decision.  The 
Erlebachs have failed to show error. 
 Finally, the Erlebachs argue the record demonstrates that the indictments 
should have been dismissed with prejudice.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 16-40.)  
Review of this argument shows it to be without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss an indictment based on 
irregularities in grand jury proceedings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  
State v. Marsalis, 151 Idaho 872, 875, 264 P.3d 979, 982 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing 
State v. Bujanda–Velazquez, 129 Idaho 726, 728, 932 P.2d 354, 356 (1997)).  
 
C. The Erlebachs Have Failed To Show Extreme Circumstances Where 
Dismissal Without Prejudice Is An Insufficient Remedy 
 
 The general standards for a motion to dismiss for irregularities in the 
grand jury proceedings are well established: 
Our inquiry into the propriety of the grand jury proceeding is two-
fold. First, we must determine whether, independent of any 
inadmissible evidence, the grand jury received legally sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. Second, even if 
such legally sufficient evidence were presented, the indictment 
must be dismissed if the prosecutorial misconduct in submitting 
illegal evidence was so egregious as to be prejudicial. 
 
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 448, 872 P.2d 708, 711 (1994).  “To determine 
whether misconduct is so grievous as to be prejudicial and thus to require 




misconduct against the extent of the evidence supporting the indictment.”  State 
v. Marsalis, 151 Idaho 872, 876, 264 P.3d 979, 983 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations 
omitted).   
Generally, prosecutorial misconduct will require dismissal only 
when it reaches the level of a constitutional due process violation. 
In order to be entitled to dismissal of an indictment on due process 
grounds, the defendant must affirmatively show prejudice caused 
by the misconduct. We note that dismissal is a drastic remedy and 
should be exercised only in extreme and outrageous situations, and 
therefore, the defendant has a heavy burden. 
 
State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 237, 743 P.2d 459, 466 (1987). 
 The showing of prejudice required for dismissal based on prosecutorial 
misconduct “means the defendant would not have been indicted but for the 
misconduct.”  Id.   
To determine whether misconduct gives rise to a dismissal, a 
reviewing court will have to balance the gravity and the seriousness 
of this misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
the probable cause finding. At one extreme, the misconduct can be 
so outrageous that regardless of the extent of probable cause 
evidence, dismissal will be required. At the other extreme, the 
misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes unnecessary to 
question the independent judgment of the grand jury. In the middle 
of these extremes, the court must examine the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the indictment should be 
dismissed. As stated above, the burden rests with the criminal 
defendant to make an initial showing that the misconduct rises to 
the level of prejudice. Absent the showing of prejudice, a reviewing 
court will not second guess the grand jury. However, once the 
defendant does affirmatively prove prejudice, the court must 
dismiss. 
 
Id.  See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1988).  
Thus, under Idaho’s standards, prejudice rising to the level of a due process 
violation is a prerequisite to any dismissal where, as here, the evidence is 




 The Idaho cases do not express any circumstances where the dismissal of 
an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct will result in dismissal with prejudice.  
Other courts that have done so provide that dismissal with prejudice is a sanction 
appropriate only in extreme circumstances.  United States v. Campagnuolo, 
592 F.2d 852, 865 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The supervisory powers of a district judge, 
however, allow him to impose the extreme sanction of dismissal of an indictment 
with prejudice only in extraordinary situations.”); United States v. Slough, 679 F. 
Supp. 2d 55, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2010) (“dismissal without prejudice is ordinarily the 
only appropriate remedy” but dismissal with prejudice as a sanction may be 
appropriate in “extreme circumstances”).  Such extreme circumstances are 
limited to “where the actual evidence against the defendants is tainted 
irrevocably, or there exists a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct that is 
widespread or continuous.”  United States v. Acquest Dev., LLC, 932 F. Supp. 2d 
453, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (quotations and ellipses omitted). See also Com. v. 
Baker, 11 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissal with prejudice only 
appropriate where “the prosecuting attorney’s action irrevocably tainted the 
evidence or would prejudice [defendant’s] case upon trial”); State v. Eder, 
704 P.2d 465, 468 (N.M. App. 1985) (dismissal with prejudice appropriate only 
where “nothing short of a dismissal with prejudice would cure the injury suffered 
by defendants”).   
 The reasons for dismissing with prejudice only in extreme cases are as 
follows: 
Although defendants do have a constitutional right to an informed 




forever investigation into their alleged criminal conduct. While 
outrageous government conduct could taint evidence irrevocably, 
or prejudice a defendant’s case on the merits such that notions of 
due process and fundamental fairness would preclude reindictment, 
questioning a grand jury witness in a harassing manner or 
prejudicing a grand jury with inflammatory remarks is generally 
curable. Thus, most federal courts that have dismissed indictments 
due to prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury room have done 
so without prejudice to subsequent reindictment.  
 
United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 172 (D. Md. 1980).  “Finally, the 
Supreme Court as well as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly pointed out that 
dismissal of an indictment, particularly with prejudice, is a drastic measure. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has cautioned that when faced with 
prosecutorial misconduct, a court should ‘tailor[] relief appropriate in the 
circumstances.’”  United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992), as 
amended on denial of reh’g (Nov. 25, 1992) (brackets original) (quoting United 
States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)).  If there is an adequate remedy 
short of dismissal with prejudice, “dismissing the indictment is simply an 
unwarranted ‘windfall’ to the defendants.”  Id., 974 F.2d at 1099. 
 The Erlebachs have failed to show that allowing their re-indictment would 
violate due process.  The error in this case falls far short of extreme 
circumstances that would taint the evidence or is indicative of a pattern of 
abuses.  Any prejudice from an indictment by less than twelve qualified jurors is 
easily cured by dismissal without prejudice so either a complete grand jury may 
consider the evidence or probable cause may be established in a preliminary 
hearing.  Moreover, the Erlebachs failed to show a pattern of abuses, much less 




the conclusion that the ultimate sanction was warranted, the Erlebachs have 
failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
 The Erlebachs’ first claim of error is that the district court cited I.C.R. 48 as 
the legal basis for its dismissal without prejudice.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 10-15.)  
I.C.R. 48 allows the district court to dismiss when it concludes that “such 
dismissal serves the ends of justice.”  I.C.R. 48(a)(2).  Dismissal under the rule 
“is not a bar” to refiling “if the offense is a felony.”  I.C.R. 48(c).  Thus, I.C.R. 48 is 
the legal authority allowing the district court to do what it did: dismiss without 
prejudice.  Citing the relevant legal authority for its actions was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
 The Erlebachs argue that citing I.C.R. 48 means the court was unaware 
that dismissal with prejudice was an option.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 10-15.)  This 
argument does not withstand analysis.  The Erlebachs argued that the district 
court should dismiss with prejudice as a sanction for alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct.  (#44470 Sealed R., pp. 19-26; 5/20/16 Tr., p. 135, Ls. 4-10; p. 145, 
Ls. 16-23.)  The state argued that such a sanction would be inappropriate, but 
did not claim that such a remedy was unavailable to the court.  (#44470 R., 
pp. 113-14.)  The record establishes that the district court was aware it could 
dismiss with prejudice, but simply declined to do so and instead dismissed under 
I.C.R. 48.   
 Next, the Erlebachs contend the district court erred by failing to make 
findings of fact.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 15-16.)  Remand for additional fact-finding 




discretion.  Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 680, 201 P.3d 647, 653 (2009) 
(“When the record is such that this Court is incapable of reviewing the trial court’s 
decision for an abuse of discretion, we must remand for appropriate findings.”); 
Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 554, 165 P.3d 261, 268 (2007) (“The 
absence of findings may be disregarded by an appellate court where the record 
is clear and yields an obvious answer to the relevant question.”).  The record in 
this case, however, contains extensive findings of fact by the district court 
showing the basis for its decision.  (#44468 R., pp. 311-18; #44470 R., pp. 119-
26.2)  There is no reason to think that any relevant facts were omitted from the 
district court’s analysis.  That the district court did not set forth in detail why it 
rejected the Erlebachs’ other factual allegations does not show error. 
 Finally, the Erlebachs argue the record demonstrates that the indictments 
should have been dismissed with prejudice.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 16-40.)  
Review of this argument shows it to be without merit.   
 The Erlebachs asserted three grand jurors endorsing the indictments, 
numbers 1, 19 and 11, were biased.  (E.g., #44468 Sealed R., pp. 4-13.3)  The 
                                            
2 The only factual claims the district court expressly declined to decide related to 
whether two other grand jurors should have been disqualified.  (#44468 R., 
p. 317, n. 1; #44470 R., p. 125, n. 1.) 
 
3 On appeal the Erlebachs admit their claim about Grand Juror 19 being biased or 
unqualified is based on speculation, but assert the misconduct is the prosecutor’s 
failure to fully explore potential bias.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 23-24.)  They cite no 
authority for the proposition that the prosecutor had such a duty or that the 
prosecutor’s voir dire of the grand jurors failed in that duty.  State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.”).  The Erlebachs’ argument in relation to Grand Juror 11 is the same 




district court did find that Grand Juror 1 had expressed bias and her statements 
that her bias would not affect her deliberations were equivocal.  (#44468, R., pp. 
314-16; #44470 R., pp. 122-24.)  The Court declined to address whether Grand 
Jurors 19 and 11 were qualified.  (#44468 R., p. 317, n. 1; #44470 R., p. 125, 
n. 1.)  As set forth above, lack of twelve qualified grand jurors is easily remedied 
by dismissal of the indictment without prejudice.  This is true in this case 
regardless of whether the number of qualified grand jurors was eleven or ten or 
nine. 
The Erlebachs next contend the prosecutor presented false testimony or 
failed to present exculpatory evidence.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 28-40.)  The district 
court necessarily rejected this argument because it did not order that the state 
present any different evidence before a grand jury if it sought re-indictment.  
(#44468 R., pp. 311-19; #44470 R., pp. 119-27.)  Moreover, counsel for the 
Erlebachs does not contend that the district court erred under the applicable legal 
standard.  The applicable standard is that “when a prosecuting attorney 
conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which 
directly negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation the prosecutor must 
present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury.”  I.C.R. 6.2(a) 
(emphasis added).  Counsel for the Erlebachs acknowledges that this is the 
                                                                                                                                  
state he could set that bias aside.  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 24-25.)  The state 
submits Grand Juror 11 never stated he was biased, only that he knew one of the 
witnesses (the neighbor to whom K.B. fled).  (Amended G.J. Tr., p. 13, L. 22 – 
p. 14, L. 3.)  The state submits Grand Jurors 19 and 11 were qualified.  At a 





applicable legal standard.  (Appellants’ brief, p. 34.4)  However, at no point does 
counsel for the Erlebachs make any attempt to apply the correct legal standard 
or make any argument based on the correct legal standard.  (Appellants’ brief, 
pp. 28-34.)  Rather, counsel argues only that the prosecutor “repeatedly failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence.”  (Appellants’ brief, pp. 28-29, 31-34, 36, 38.)  
The rule imposes no duty on the prosecutor to present every bit of impeaching 
evidence or evidence that might support some theoretical defense.  Because the 
Erlebachs’ argument is not based on the correct legal standard, and does not 
actually articulate how the prosecutor allegedly violated the requirements of 
I.C.R. 6.2, their claim of error by the trial court fails.   
Even if this Court were willing to undergo a factual analysis of the 
Erlebachs’ claims, application of the correct legal standard to the record shows 
them to be lacking any merit.  First, the Erlebachs claim that all the witnesses 
lied, asserting the photographic evidence is contrary to their testimony.  
(Appellants’ brief, pp. 28-33.)  This argument does not withstand even a cursory 
review of the officers’ video and the other photographic evidence.  To the 
contrary, the photographic and video evidence corroborates the testimony of the 
witnesses.  (State’s Exhibits 1, 2.)   
                                            
4 Counsel at another point misstates the standard: “Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2 
states that a prosecutor must present or disclose known exculpatory evidence to 
the grand jury.”  (Appellants’ brief, p. 33.)  To the extent counsel is arguing that 
the prosecutor has a duty under the rule to present all impeaching evidence and 
all evidence that would support a defense theory, such a claim is directly contrary 
to the plain language of the rule.  See In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476, 479, 
210 P.3d 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Where the language of a rule is plain and 





The Erlebachs will have ample opportunity to claim that the officers’ 
videos of a violent struggle contradict the officers’ testimony that Tyrell fought 
them and had to be subdued.  They will also have opportunity to argue that 
evidence of the victim’s statement of her opinion that Tyrell’s actions—taking off 
his clothes, getting on her naked and pulling aside her underwear while 
threatening to show her what his penis could do—did not constitute attempted 
rape is admissible and that it establishes his innocence.  The state believes such 
evidence and arguments will not raise even a reasonable doubt.  At a minimum 
there is no good faith basis to conclude all the witnesses perjured themselves, 
and even a cursory review shows that the videos are not “substantial evidence 
which directly negates the guilt of the subject” of the grand jury.  
Finally, the Erlebachs contend the prosecutor presented hearsay 
evidence.  (Appellants’ brief, p. 35.)  “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801(c).  The actual exchange 
was as follows: 
Q Okay. Did you do any sort of forensic or sexual investigation 




Q Was there a basis to believe you needed to do so? 
 
A No. She had said that Tyrell had attempted to force himself 
on her but hadn’t actually succeeded in doing so. 
 







Q --direct sexual contact? 
 
A No.  … 
 
(G.J. Tr., p. 82, Ls. 9-19.)  From this context it is clear that the evidence of K.B.’s 
statement was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but instead 
to establish why the officer did not pursue a rape kit or other sexual assault 
forensic investigation.5  The Erlebachs have failed to show that inadmissible 
hearsay was presented, much less that it was presented egregiously such that 
dismissal of the indictment without prejudice was an inadequate remedy for the 
error. 
 The Erlebachs have failed to establish any clear error in the district court’s 
implicit rejection of their claims of prosecutorial misconduct other than failure to 
disqualify Grand Juror 1.  They have also failed to establish that this case 
presents extreme circumstances under which the district court could exercise its 
discretion in no other way than to dismiss with prejudice. 
 
  
                                            
5 Implicit in counsel’s argument is the underlying belief that K.B.’s statement that 
Tyrell had tried to remove her underwear without her permission while naked and 
threatening to show her what his penis would do—K.B.’s consistent recitation of 
the facts in question—did not constitute a statement that Tyrell had tried to force 
himself on her.  The state asserts that characterizing K.B.’s consistent factual 
assertion regarding Tyrell’s actions as saying that Tyrell had attempted to force 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
dismissal without prejudice. 
 DATED this 10th day of March, 2017. 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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